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Through problematization, Foucault bares the ethical teleology of 
homosexuality in friendship. In an interview, he describes friendship 
as a way of life. In parallel with his problematization of pleasure and 
the love of boys in the Greco-Roman technologies of the self, friendship 
could be more fully understood as a mode of cultivating the self in 
relation to a practice of truth between friends. According to Foucault, 
this cultivation or care of the self is at the same time a practice of 
freedom that defines an “aesthetics of existence.” On the other hand, at 
present, friendship could become a practice of freedom through a 
resistance of the discourse of sexuality and the overcoming of 
homosexuality as a sexological concept. In this paper, an alternative 
way of looking at homosexuality in an ethical manner is thus 
construed with Foucault. 
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Michel Foucault’s later works have been largely concentrated in 
working out what he calls the constitution of an ethical substance by 
the individual. Ethics, as he claims upon his retrieval of the Greco-
Roman practices of the self, is an enterprise of epimeleia heautou, that 
is, the care or cultivation of the self. Contrary to what has become the 
customary textbook claim of the Greeks’ primary preoccupation with 
knowledge, based on the Delphic oracle or Socratic maxim “Know 
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which knowledge itself seeks to serve. Thus ethics is intimately tied to 
truth because to become ethical is a question of how the subject 
constitutes himself in a certain practice of truth. While the care of self 
maintains an ontological priority in ethics, the preponderance of the 
problem of the relationship with others is maintained by Foucault in as 
much as the self is inextricable from a network of relations. In other 
words, taking care of the self is incomprehensible outside the context 
of human relations. Thus, in this sense, the ethical problem is at the 
same time a political issue. 
It is in this context of Foucault’s later works that this paper seeks 
to answer the problem: “What is the ethical status of homosexuality?” 
This will be accomplished by drawing the connections between 
Foucault’s analyses in an interview where he thematically addressed 
the questions surrounding homosexuality and his ideas in the three 
volumes of the History of Sexuality as well as his lectures in Berkeley. 
In the interview, Foucault discloses friendship as the ethical issue 
veiled by the discourse on sexuality. Friendship is widely discussed by 
Foucault, on the other hand, in The Use of Pleasure and Care of the Self 
within the general significance of the self’s relation with others 
ordained towards the teleological aim for an aesthetics of existence.  
The paper begins with a description of the method of 
“problematization”, which Foucault employs to approach the issue of 
homosexuality and his problematization of homosexuality itself, from 
an interview titled “Friendship as a Way of Life” and the first volume of 
the History of Sexuality. Then a wider thematization of friendship 
follows as extracted within the broader horizon of Foucault’s ethics. I 
will argue that based on Foucault’s categorical description of 
friendship as a way of life, friendship then could also be subsumed 
within the finality of the ethical project towards an aesthetics of 
existence. I will reinforce this by exploring the ubiquity of friendship in 
Foucault’s genealogy of the Greco-Roman technologies of the self, 
particularly showing the parallelism between Foucault’s 
problematization of pleasure and the love of boys, which for the 
Greeks, is likewise ordained to friendship. The third part is a further 
amplification of the various ways whereby friendship becomes a mode 
of cultivating the self in relation to truth that stands between friends. 
The concluding part articulates an alternative way of looking at 
homosexuality in an ethical manner as worked out in the preceding 
discussions with Foucault. 
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The Problematics of Homosexuality 
 
Foucault’s problematization of homosexuality in the interview 
“Friendship as a Way of Life” showcases the project centered on ethics 
which preoccupied him in the remaining years of his life. The method 
of problematization which Foucault attaches to ethics, or the “practice 
of living” as he traces and credits it to the Greeks, is “a process by 
which an aspect of reality, of one’s world, one’s experience, is brought 
into focus as a problem in need of a response.”1 Foucault makes this 
methodological consideration more explicit in what he claims to be 
performing as a historian of thought: 
 
…the analysis of the way an unproblematic field of experience, 
or a set of practices, which were accepted without question, 
which were familiar and “silent,” out of discussion, becomes a 
problem, raises discussion and debate, incites new reactions, 
and induces a crisis in the previously silent behavior, habits, 
practices, and institutions.2 
 
Hence, through problematization one becomes concerned about a 
certain matter. In the words of Foucault, “people begin to take care of 
something … they become anxious about this or that – for example, 
about madness, about crime, about sex, about themselves, or about 
truth.”3 Edward Mcgushin’s rightfully simple interpretation of it is 
that: “this caring-about-something is a way of disclosing the world in 
light of a problem and is therefore a response to that problem.”4 This 
strongly suggests the intimate interplay of thought and practice 
immanent in “caring” as Foucault had in mind.   
 
Thought is not what inhabits a certain conduct and gives it 
meaning; rather, it is what allows one to step back from this 
way of acting and reacting, to present it to oneself as an object 
of thought and to question it as to its meaning, its conditions 
and its goals. Thought is freedom in relation to what one does, 
                                                 
1 Edward F. Mcgushin, Foucault’s Askesis: An Introduction to the 
Philosophical Life (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 
16. 
2 Michel Foucault, Fearless Speech, ed. by Joseph Pearson (Los Angeles, 
California: Semiotext, 2001), 74. 
3 Ibid. 
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the motion by which one detaches oneself from it, establishes 
it as an object and reflects on it as a problem”5 
 
Problematization in other words is an emancipative activity where 
one scrutinizes a present state of affairs and opens up possibilities of 
becoming6 (different). As in Todd May’s similar description: 
“problematization does open the door to a power that creates 
subjectivity.”7 May’s remark allows for an interpretation of Foucault’s 
philosophy where an individual is rendered more active in the 
formation of its subjectivity. Furthermore, problematization could also 
be rightly rendered as a diagnostic practice. Mcgushin describes the 
Foucauldian practice of philosophy as “diagnostician of the present,”8 a 
description that fairly accounts for the connection of Foucault’s 
method of genealogy9 in Discipline and Punish and in the first volume 
of The History of Sexuality with his later works on ethics. Conceived as 
diagnostics, Foucault’s preceding analyses of disciplinary power, 
knowledge and bio-politics may already be considered as 
problematizations that relaxes power’s hold upon the subject, 
diminish oppression and salvage the subject from total bankruptcy.  
In the interview, Foucault incisively opens up the ethical issue of 
friendship which was eclipsed by the strategic discourses of sexuality 
particularly encapsulated in homosexuality. Here the problematization 
of homosexuality can be read side by side with the diagnostics which 
Foucault undertakes in The History of Sexuality. By identifying 
friendship as the real problem of homosexuality, Foucault actually 
opens up and makes more explicit the resistance to the repressive 
discourses of sexuality. In the interview, Foucault says: 
 
The more it is written by young people the more it concerns 
young people. But the problem is not to make room for one 
age group alongside another but to find out what can be done 
in relation to the quasi identification between homosexuality 
                                                 
5 Quoted in Mcgushin, Foucault’s Askesis, 16. 
6 I am using the term “becoming” in the Deleuzian sense of a “continual 
production of difference immanent within the constitution of events, whether 
physical or otherwise.” Adrian Parr, The Deleuze Dictionary (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 26. 
7 Todd May, The Philosophy of Michel Foucault (Bucks: Acumen Publishing 
Limited, 2006), 106. 
8 Mcgushin, Foucault’s Askesis, xiv. 
9 “Genealogy is the tracing of the history of an institution or a practice by 
asking which forces have taken hold of it, active or reactive ones.” May, The 
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and the love among young people. Another thing to distrust is 
the tendency to relate the question of homosexuality to the 
problem of "Who am I?" and "What is the secret of my desire?" 
Perhaps it would be better to ask oneself, "What relations, 
through homosexuality, can be established, invented, 
multiplied, and modulated?" The problem is not to discover in 
oneself the truth of one's sex, but, rather, to use one's 
sexuality henceforth to arrive at a multiplicity of relationships. 
And, no doubt, that's the real reason why homosexuality is not 
a form of desire but something desirable. Therefore, we have 
to work at becoming homosexuals and not be obstinate in 
recognizing that we are. The development toward which the 
problem of homosexuality tends is the one of friendship.10 
 
In the History of Sexuality, Foucault declares that homosexuality is 
a nineteenth-century construct arising from the proliferation of the 
discourses on sexuality: 
 
This new persecution of the peripheral sexualities entailed an 
incorporation of perversions and a new specification of 
individuals. As defined by the ancient civil or canonical codes, 
sodomy was a category of forbidden acts; their perpetrator 
was nothing more than the juridical subject of them. The 
nineteenth century homosexual became a personage, a past, a 
case history, and a childhood, in addition to being a type of 
life, a life form, and a morphology, with an indiscreet anatomy 
and possibly a mysterious physiology. Nothing that went into 
his total composition was unaffected by his sexuality. It was 
everywhere present in him: at the root of all his actions 
because it was their insidious and indefinitely active principle; 
written immodestly on his face and body because it was a 
secret that always gave itself away. It was consubstantial with 
him, less as a habitual sin than as a singular nature. We must 
not forget that the psychological, psychiatric, medical category 
of homosexuality was constituted from the moment it was 
characterized – Westphal's famous article of 1870 on 
"contrary sexual sensations" can stand as its date of birth I-
less by a type of sexual relations than by a certain quality of 
sexual sensibility, a certain way of inverting the masculine and 
                                                 
10 Michel Foucault, “Friendship as a Way of Life” in Ethics Subjectivity and 
Truth The Essential Works of Michel Foucault Volume 1, Edited by Paul 




58     Victor John M. Loquias 
the feminine in oneself. Homosexuality appeared as one of the 
forms of sexuality when it was transposed from the practice of 
sodomy onto a kind of interior androgyny, a hermaphrodism 
of the soul. The sodomite had been a temporary aberration; 
the homosexual was now a species.11 
 
Foucault exposes that the sexuality of the homosexual became the 
primary and substantial form of his intelligibility in as much as it is the 
truth produced and designated to him by the scientia sexualis. The 
strategic discourses on procreation and population relegated 
individuals who manifest the newly specified psychological traits into 
homosexuals whose very identities were made identical to it. 
Homosexuality is a power-knowledge construct that constituted the 
destinies of individuals who bear it either secretly or in the open. In 
other words, the sexuality of the homosexual controls his very life. 
Foucault alludes to the Faustian pact “instilled in us by the deployment 
of sexuality”12 where sex exercises absolute power over us in return 
for the truth and sovereignty of sex. What the deployment of sexuality 
actually instilled in us is the desire for sex which Foucault clarifies as 
“the desire to have it, to have access to it, to discover it, to liberate it, to 
articulate it in discourse, to formulate it in truth,”13 or in other words, 
the will to knowledge about sex. But this desirability itself is the very 
trap which produced the illusion of freedom where in fact one is 
actually rendered bereft of life itself. Vitality is extracted out from life, 
and the capacity of experiencing pleasure is benumbed by this will to 
knowledge.   
 
It is often said that we have been incapable of imagining any 
new pleasures. We have at least invented a different kind of 
pleasure: pleasure in the truth of pleasure, the pleasure of 
knowing that truth, of discovering and exposing it, the 
fascination of seeing it and telling it, of captivating and 
capturing others by it, of confiding it in secret, of luring it out 
in the open-the specific pleasure of the true discourse on 
pleasure.14 
 
                                                 
11  Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Volume 1: An Introduction, 
Translated by Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 42-43. 
12 Ibid., 156. 
13 Ibid. 
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This critique of sexuality forms part of Foucault’s polemic against 
the bankruptcy of disciplinary power. Its exposure to daylight opens 
up possibilities of resistance. The irresistible desire to know the truth 
about sex, which has lead to the deployment of sexuality and within 
which homosexuality is made intelligible, must be unveiled as the 
illusion that one must break away from. “The rallying point for the 
counterattack against the deployment of sexuality,” Foucault 
admonishes, “ought not to be sex-desire, but bodies and pleasure.”15  
Under these preceding considerations, the trajectory of Foucault’s 
problematization of homosexuality appears in a clearer view. In the 
interview, he insists that “homosexuality is not a form of desire.” The 
commonplace treatment of homosexuality is its reduction to, and as if 
nothing more than, the attraction or desire for each other between two 
men that eventually gets entangled with various other discourses such 
as immorality, abnormality, unnaturalness, and perversion. Foucault 
cautions us to be on guard from “the tendency to relate the question of 
homosexuality to the problem of "’Who am I?’ and ‘What is the secret 
of my desire?’”; more so “the problem is not to discover in oneself the 
truth of one's sex.” This is because they are all reactions that emanate 
from the discourse of sexuality itself. To encapsulate the problem into 
the truth of one’s sex as something to be discovered, as a substantial or 
natural ground of one’s being is already acquiescence to the identity 
specified by sexuality. Thus, even the standpoint of some people who 
fight for sexual freedom, where homosexuality is rallied as a natural 
phenomenon instead of a historical one and thereby worthy of 
insistence for institutional equality, is still actually operating in 
complicity with the deployment of sexuality. 
What Foucault ruptures open in the problem of homosexuality is 
the very possibility of becoming which was eclipsed by sexuality – that 
is, friendship. Unlike the common notion of friendship nowadays 
proliferated in mainstream media by celebrity-personalities as a 
“state” where either one or both parties are expected to maintain 
sameness for the preservation of their relationship, Foucault describes 
friendship as “a relationship that is still formless,” as something to be 
invented “from A to Z.”16 The main problem regarding sexuality is the 
problem about the creation or invention of a way of life. Foucault says,  
 
A way of life can be shared among individuals of different age, 
status, and social activity. It can yield intense relations not 
resembling those that are institutionalized. It seems to me 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 157. 
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that a way of life can yield a culture and an ethics. To be "gay," 
I think, is not to identify with the psychological traits and the 
visible masks of the homosexual but to try to define and 
develop a way of life.17 
 
Friendship, on which the problem of homosexuality is anchored, is 
an ethical issue. Sex-desire, as quoted above, is not the point for 
resistance but bodies and pleasures. Foucault writes this in the last 
chapter of The History of Sexuality where he seems to introduce the 
enterprise of ethics that will preoccupy the next volume on The Use of 
Pleasure. In the interview, Foucault in the same vein describes 
friendship as “the sum of everything through which they can give each 
other pleasure.”18 
The next part turns now to Foucault’s analysis of the ancient 
practices where friendship as a way of life has been determined in 
various relations in the experience of pleasure. 
 
 
Pleasure and Friendship in Ancient Technologies of the Self 
 
Foucault strongly recommends a return to, and getting in touch 
once more with our passions as a form of resistance to the will to 
knowledge and imposition of disciplinarity. And Foucault’s analysis of 
ancient Greek and Greco-Roman models provides the concrete 
historical reinforcement. Pleasure today has become so nebulous in 
that it has been entangled with a lot of discourses from the religious to 
the secular. Unmasked, the experience of pleasure is the main target of 
swarming advertisements by capitalists to market their products and 
services. In ethico-religious institutions, pleasure is supposed to be 
policed and subscribed to a set of codes of behavior and prohibitions 
with the thought that it might run amok unless otherwise tamed. In 
short, pleasure is something to be either controlled (by the market) or 
disciplined (by institutions). In both cases, pleasure is treated as an 
impulse which has to be kept in check and/or utilized for instrumental 
purposes. A person in this setting can hardly be thought of as the 
source and subject of his own actions that produce pleasure. Foucault 
problematizes this notion of pleasure and opens up a wide array of 
possibilities of “experiencing” pleasure.  
Commenting on the translation of the French plural term plaisirs 
(originally used by Foucault) into the singular English term “pleasure” 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 137-138. 
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in The Use of Pleasure, Carvalho writes that it obscures the important 
point that for the Greeks, “pleasure was not a single substantive 
impulse but an array of affects felt across the various domains and 
sub-domains of the life of the body, the institution of marriage, the 
relations between men and boys and the pursuit of the truth. In each of 
these domains, there was a form of problematization, a set of 
difficulties and proposed resolutions of those difficulties, associated 
with the use of pleasures in that domain.”19 Carvalho’s remark is 
noteworthy because for Foucault, pleasure is related to an aesthetics 
of existence, where a subject’s use of it is valuated not according to 
conformity with a code of behavior or goal of purification, but 
according to the “intensity of its practice”20 under one’s control of 
modulation. By “aesthetics of existence” Foucault refers to the 
“intentional and voluntary actions by which men not only set 
themselves rules of conduct, but also seek to transform themselves, to 
change themselves in their singular being, and to make their life into 
an oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain 
stylistic criteria.”21 The use of pleasure then is performed within the 
context of a “practice of liberty,” not in the traditional sense of free 
will, but towards the creation of a life fashioned and governed by 
oneself. According to Foucault, pleasure was problematized by the 
Greeks as an ethical issue thus, its ethical determination relies heavily 
on the relation that a subject has to himself. In the analysis of 
aphrodisia, or “acts, gestures, and contacts that produce a certain form 
of pleasure”22 whether it be regarding food, drinks or sexual activity, 
the question raised is whether how one must make use of nature’s 
endowments. The “right use” of pleasure or chresis is valued by the 
Greeks according to Foucault in cognizance of nature’s tendency to be 
excessive. Moderation, as Aristotle taught in the Nicomachean Ethics, is 
a virtue in so far as one is able to act rationally in between excessive 
and deficient passions. Or in today’s expression, one acts in his right 
mind or proper senses. However, Foucault perceives moderation more 
as a radical and self-constitutive technique. This is particularly evident 
in his statement that 
...moderation could not take the form of an obedience to a 
system of laws or a codification of behaviors; nor could it 
                                                 
19 John M. Carvalho, “For the Love of Boys” in Foucault Studies 17: 218, 
April 2014.  
20 Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure: Volume 2 of The History of 
Sexuality, Translated by Robert Hurley (New York: Vntage Books, 1990), 44. 
21 Ibid., 10-11. 
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serve as a principle for nullifying pleasures; it was an art, a 
practice of pleasures that was capable of self-limitation 
through the use of those pleasure…23 
 
Pleasure then is not perceived as an evil that must be purged, or 
the satisfaction of which leads one to sin. It is rather something very 
natural as a need shared by everyone. But the right use of pleasure 
requires one’s being able to act according to the temporal order in 
nature and also based on one’s unique status held in the society. Thus, 
the use of pleasure in no way can simply be judged on contemporary 
moral yardstick as selfish because it is at the same time a 
determination of an ethico-political performance where one could 
either showcase excellence (arête), “to be outstanding among others”24 
in Alexander Nehamas’ rendering or, if one does not perform well, 
exhibit hamartia, which H.D.F. Kitto translates as “failure to hit the 
right mark.”25   
Moderation nonetheless cannot be done “unless one is capable of 
opposing, resisting, and subduing”26 natural forces. “In the domain of 
pleasures,” Foucault writes, “virtue was not conceived as a state of 
integrity, but as a relationship of domination, a relation of mastery … 
In other words, to form oneself as a virtuous and moderate subject in 
the use he makes of pleasures, the individual has to construct a 
relationship with the self that is of the ‘domination-submission,’ 
‘command-obedience,’ ‘mastery-docility’ type (and not, as will be the 
case in Christian spirituality, a relationship of the ‘elucidation-
renunciation,’ ‘decipherment-purification’ type).27 In these lines, there 
is a clearly emphasized intensification of the subject’s sovereignty over 
his actions and a contradistinction to the later Christian moral 
principles of self-renunciation. For the Greeks, this active form of self-
mastery is called enkrateia. In contrast to the control society of the 
present, the Greeks according to Foucault, aimed at domination in the 
area of desires and pleasures.28 
                                                 
23 Ibid., 57. 
24 Alexander Nehamas, The Art of Living: Socratic Reflections from Plato to 
Foucault (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 78.   
25 Kitto, H.D.F. Kitto, The Greeks (Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin 
Books, 1965), 170-171. 
26 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, 66. 
27 Ibid.,70. 
28 “Enkrateia is characterized more by an active form of self-mastery, 
which enables one to resist or struggle, and to achieve domination in the area 
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But to put oneself into, and remain within the axis of struggle, 
resistance and domination of pleasures is neither something endowed 
by nature, nor achieved by an individual overnight, nor is it a divine 
providential gift. Self-mastery is incumbent upon one’s own effort and 
thus, is never an easy task. In this vein, the Greeks according to 
Foucault puts premium on practices (techne) of the self, the finality of 
which, is no other than self-domination. These practices are referred 
to by the Greeks as ascesis , or askesis which may take in different 
forms such as “training, meditation, tests of thinking, examination of 
conscience and control of representations.”29 Later in Christianity, 
asceticism became associated with the purging of pleasures and 
renunciation of self. But for the Greeks, askesis remained a worldly 
enterprise of attending to oneself in order to perform well in matters 
that concern his existence. Hence, askesis is associated with the most 
basic requirement of becoming ethical — epimeleia heautou. 
 
This epimeleia heautou, care of the self, which was a 
precondition that had to be met before one was qualified to 
attend to the affairs of others or lead them, included not only 
the need to know (to know the things one does not know, to 
know that one is ignorant, to know one's own nature), but to 
attend effectively to the self, and to exercise and transform 
oneself.30  
 
Before a further exposition of the care of self which is central to 
Foucault’s ethics, it is beneficial to review the import of the 
problematization of pleasure and its value to one’s becoming ethical as 
Foucault analyzes it among the Greeks. When Foucault declares 
“bodies and pleasures” as the rallying point for resistance of the 
deployment of sexuality, he was then referring to the very material 
through which an individual can constitute himself as an ethical 
subject. The use that one makes of pleasure from the standpoint of 
self-mastery gained through ascetic practice is a liberating practice. 
Pleasure, as it were, makes possible ones individual becoming through 
the practice of asceticism.  Asceticism “not in the sense of a morality of 
renunciation but as an exercise of the self on the self by which one 
attempts to develop and transform oneself, and to attain to a certain 
mode of being,”31 or in other words – freedom.  As Foucault adds, “for 
                                                 
29 Ibid., 74. 
30 Ibid., 73. 
31 Michel Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of 
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what is ethics, if not the practice of freedom, the conscious practice of 
freedom?”32 
Based on these preceding considerations, Foucault’s diagnostics of 
homosexuality as a biopolitical discourse of scientia sexualis skewed 
from the ethical concern of friendship can now be properly 
understood in parallelism with his analysis of erotics. For the Greeks, 
the pleasure that derives from the love of boys is not an object for 
censorship, prohibition or conformity to rigid universal or religious 
laws, because just like the other activities that produce pleasure, it is 
likewise a potent material for becoming ethical.  
 
The Greeks did not see love for one's own sex and love for the 
other sex as opposites, as two exclusive choices, two radically 
different types of behavior. The dividing lines did not follow 
that kind of boundary. What distinguished a moderate, self-
possessed man from one given to pleasures was, from the 
viewpoint of ethics, much more important than what 
differentiated, among themselves, the categories of pleasures 
that invited the greatest devotion.33 
 
To desire a man or a woman is a function of the appetite endowed 
by nature hence “relations between young boys and men were deemed 
completely natural.”34 The strategy of need, timeliness and status 
comes into play in this particular form of relation. While it was not a 
problem to delight in boys, to be amorous to someone who has way 
passed the aesthetic requirement and desirability of boyhood would 
be distasteful. On the part of the young boy, “to be an object of 
pleasure and to acknowledge oneself as such constituted a major 
difficulty”35 because it was at variance with the “relationship that he 
was expected to establish with himself in order to become a free man, 
master of himself and capable of prevailing over others.”36 The ethical 
challenge is therefore more intense in the budding man. It is in this 
crucial stage where self-mastery has to be exhibited in view of the 
status that he will later take as an adult citizen, citizenship which the 
Greeks regarded as an enterprise of free men. So the boy must not 
                                                                                                      
Foucault Volume 1, Edited by Paul Rabinow (New York: The New Press, 1994), 
282. 
32 Ibid., 284. 
33 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, 187. 
34 Ibid., 194. 
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identify himself with being an object of pleasure and imprudently 
accept whatever favors offered to him by lovers. Foucault writes, “by 
not yielding, not submitting, remaining the strongest, triumphing over 
suitors and lovers through one's resistance, one's firmness, one's 
moderation (sophrosyne) the young man proves his excellence in the 
sphere of love relations.”37 The sexual relation between a boy and a 
man is problematized within a decisive moment (kairos) or right time 
and conditions for it to take place in the boy’s transition to a wider 
political status. Foucault explains:  
 
Sexual relations thus demanded particular behaviors on the 
part of both partners. A consequence of the fact that the boy 
could not identify with the part he had to play; he was 
supposed to refuse, resist, flee, escape. He was also supposed 
to make his consent, if he finally gave it, subject to conditions 
relating to the man to whom he yielded (his merit, his status, 
his virtue) and to the benefit he could expect to gain from him 
(a benefit that was rather shameful if it was only a question of 
money, but honorable if it involved training for manhood, 
social connections for the future, or a lasting friendship).38 
 
The finality of sexual relation is clearly not to simply satisfy one’s 
desires or wantonly bathe each other with pleasure that sex brings, 
but to substantiate it in an ethical and political mold.  Once again, the 
use of pleasure determines the becoming-moral of an individual. 
Pleasure that is associated with erotics is natural, and temporary in so 
far as its indulgence can only be conditioned by the youthful season of 
boyhood. Hence, one must rule over them and ordain its “use” towards 
which its fleeting nature will be rendered with a noble finality. This 
finality is no other than friendship which is identified as that which 
provides “indestructibility”39 in the way men “continue to love their 
mutual affection and enjoy it down to old age.”40 
 
The love of boys could not be morally honorable unless it 
comprised (as a result of the reasonable gifts and services of 
the lover and the reserved compliance of the beloved) the 
                                                 
37 Ibid., 210. 
38 Ibid., 224. 
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elements that would form the basis of a transformation of this 
love into a definitive and socially valuable tie, that of philia.41 
 
This transformation from the bond of love to the relation of 
friendship according to Foucault is an “ethically necessary and socially 
useful”42 conversion, the latter being “more lasting, having no other 
limit than life itself; and it obliterated the dissymmetry that were 
implied in the erotic relation between man and adolescent.”43  
Here then lies the background of Foucault’s problematization of 
homosexuality as something that tends to the issue of friendship.  This 
does not mean, however, that Foucault equates the love for boys with 
homosexuality because in his own words, “homosexuality  is plainly 
inadequate as a means of referring to an experience, forms of 
valuation, and a system of categorization so different from ours.”44 
What Foucault showed is a historical artifact of a way of 
problematizing an experience towards something which an agent 
could behold as his own aesthetic creation.  Whatever semblance is left 
of the ancient Greeks’ erotics with what today is specified or identified 
as homosexuality, the problem of friendship persists as the telos of 
that form of relation. By this, friendship as an ethical problem becomes 
a quest for an aesthetics of existence which the remainder of this 
paper shall now turn to. 
 
Towards an Aesthetics of Existence 
 
Friendship is at the end of the metamorphosis from pederastic 
relations. Because the pleasure from this love relation is doomed to 
disappear, the use of pleasure must then be oriented towards 
something more enduring guaranteed alone by friendship, or philia, 
“the affinity of character and mode of life, a sharing of thoughts and 
existence, mutual benevolence.”45 Foucault cites that it is friendship at 
work in Xenophon’s portrayal of two lovers “who look into each 
other’s faces, converse, confide in one another, rejoice together or feel 
a common distress over successes and failures, and look after each 
other.”46 All these descriptions even today are manifestly observable 
among friends regardless of gender. Moreover these shared activities 
                                                 
41 Ibid., 225. 
42 Ibid., 201. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid., 187. 
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cannot be simply equated with sensuality, which today often colors 
dirty malicious minds once they witness it (especially) from lovers of 
the same sex. For the Greeks, the love for boys is a concrete and even a 
most challenging opportunity for ethical determination. The young 
boy who is to grow later as an adult and a citizen to carry tasks of 
political value can exercise early on his excellence via resistance, 
domination and self-mastery. The basic requirement for ethical 
determination mentioned above for one to attain this mastery of the 
self is the necessity to attend to oneself or epimeleia heautou. A 
clarification of this basic requirement would shed light on the role 
which a friend takes or performs in filial relationships.  
The practice of caring for the self according to Foucault stands as 
the sole condition for an aesthetics of existence. But this is far from 
today’s notion of selfishness or egoism which consists of locking 
oneself up from concern with others. On the other hand, to valorize the 
concern for others before oneself and insist on its primordiality as 
some philosophers would do misses the point of the Greeks’ ascetic 
practices.47 Foucault explains: 
 
The care of the self is ethical in itself; but it implies complex 
relationships with others insofar as this ethos of freedom is 
also a way of caring for others. This is why it is important for a 
free man who conducts himself as he should to be able to 
govern his wife, his children, his household; it is also the art of 
governing. Ethos also implies a relationship with others, 
insofar as the care of the self enables one to occupy his 
rightful position in the city, the community, or interpersonal 
relationships, whether as a magistrate or a friend. And the 
care of the self also implies a relationship with the other 
insofar as proper care of the self requires listening to the 
lessons of a master. One needs a guide, a counselor, a friend, 
someone who will be truthful with you. Thus, the problem of 
relationships with others is present throughout the 
development of the care of the self.48 
 
                                                 
47 “I don't think we can say that the Greek who cares for himself must first 
care for others. To my mind, this view only came later. Care for others should 
not be put before the care of oneself. The care of the self is ethically prior in 
that the relationship with oneself is ontologically prior.” Foucault, “The Ethics 
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The attention that is rendered to the self in the various ascetic 
practices amounts to a cultivation of the self, or “an intensification of 
the relation to oneself by which one constituted oneself as the subject 
of one’s acts,”49 and consequently, to an “intensification of social 
relations.”50 This is why for the Greeks becoming ethical is at the same 
time a political labor.51 The exercise of sovereignty over oneself which 
results into the outstanding administration of the duties emanating 
from his status is generally contributive to social cohesion. One may 
just recall the Platonic ideal of the philosopher-king who is capable 
above all to rule due to the judiciary and executive command of his 
reason over the other lower parts of his soul. Freedom, ethics and 
politics is knitted together by Foucault in the organizing principle of 
the care of the self. The following statements articulate this well,  
 
In the case of the free man, I think the postulate of this whole 
morality was that a person who took proper care of himself 
would, by the same token, be able to conduct himself properly 
in relation to others and for others. A city in which everybody 
took proper care of himself would be a city that functioned 
well and found in this the ethical principle of its 
permanence.52 
 
In the same vein, the love of boys practiced as a way of life is 
ordained towards ethics. In the third volume of The History of Sexuality 
it is described by Foucault as “an upward movement that enables man 
to escape from immediate necessities, the acquisition and 
transmission of knowledge through the intense forms and secret ties 
of friendship.”53 In retrospect, the boy has to be “selective” in his 
associations and in a way “use” his youth for noble ends, mindful of his 
fate as a future citizen. The inordinate use of pleasure would only 
prove detrimental to his end. Thus, the best choice of “lover” or 
“friend” is of the essence. As quoted above, the proper care that he 
could do at the moment of his youth is to listen to the lessons of a 
master who could at the same time serve as guide, counselor and 
friend, qualified further as someone who will be truthful to him. This 
                                                 
49 Michel Foucault, The Care of the Self: Volume 3 of The History of 
Sexuality, Translated by Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 41. 
50 Ibid., 53. 
51 “Epimileia implies labor.” Ibid., 50. 
52 Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom,” 
287. 
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amounts to saying that a parrhesiastes, or “one who speaks the truth” 
is the best man to “enroll” oneself in. The man who could perform 
parrhesia or free/fearless speech, is one whose life is characterized by 
harmony in relation to truth. In summary, 
 
parrhesia is a verbal activity in which a speaker expresses his 
personal relationship to truth, and risks his life because he 
recognizes truth-telling as a duty to improve or help other 
people (as well as himself). In parrhesia, the speaker uses his 
freedom and chooses frankness instead of persuasion, truth 
instead of falsehood or silence, the risk of death instead of life 
and security, criticism instead of flattery, and moral duty 
instead of self-interest and moral apathy.54 
 
In his lectures at Berkeley, Foucault tells a history of the practice 
of parrhesia in the ancient Greco-Roman world. The notion of care of 
the self nonetheless remains a central unifying theme. The practice of 
parrhesia in human relationships namely, community life, public life 
and personal relationships, as well as parrhesia in techniques of 
examination namely, solitary self-examination, self-diagnosis and self-
testing, all fall under the heading of care of the self. And the role of the 
friend is found ubiquitous in these various practices.  
If the parrhesiastes is the best guide to listen to, it is tantamount to 
saying that the philosopher is the best friend that one could have. This 
is highlighted by Foucault in the person of Socrates to whom in fact, in 
one passage, he traces the injunction “care of self”: 
 
In its critical aspect — and I mean critical in a broad sense — 
philosophy is that which calls into question domination at 
every level and in every form in which it exists, whether 
political, economic, sexual, institutional, or what have you. To 
a certain extent, this critical function of philosophy derives 
from the Socratic injunction "Take care of yourself," in other 
words, "Make freedom your foundation, through the mastery 
of yourself."55 
In The Use of Pleasure, philosophy is already cited by Foucault as 
an “asset that is necessary for the young man’s wise conduct.”56 And 
the function that it serves is not to train him towards a specific form of 
                                                 
54 Foucault, Fearless Speech, 19-20. 
55 Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom,” 
300-301. 
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life but “to enable him to exercise self-mastery and to triumph over 
others in the difficult game of ordeals to be undergone and honor to be 
safeguarded.”57 Foucault does not muster out the age-old philosophical 
dictum “know thyself” in his emphasis of the “care of the self.” Rather, 
he amplifies the active interplay between truth and the subject. Care 
presupposes knowledge of the self,58 and enables the self to govern 
himself with that knowledge where he becomes the subject of his own 
deliberate acts. This active relation between truth and the subject 
manifests in the life of the parrhesiastes. Being able to speak the truth 
fearlessly as a matter of duty requires a “Dorian harmony between 
logos and bios.”59 This makes Socrates a philosophical parrhesiastes par 
excellence, so that even Nicias and Laches who, despite being both 
military veterans, would still refer to Socrates and solicit his ideas on 
the best kind education when they were consulted by two elderly men 
who wanted to provide their sons with such.60 In Socrates, the 
parrhesiastes, master, and friend converge in one person.  
 
In personal relationships, the friend also takes the role of a 
parrhesiastes which Foucault reads in Plutarch. The question of the 
need for a friend is first raised, and then points to the fact that there is 
in man a domineering tendency for self-love or philautia which is the 
cause of self-delusion. A friend who could act as a parrhesiastes could 
help one rid himself of philautia. Self-delusion due to self-love 
particularly poses more concern because unlike ignorance which can 
be overcome, it disables an individual to both know that he does not 
know, and know exactly his state. This then adds a further challenge in 
distinguishing the real parrhesiastes from a flatterer. Foucault writes, 
                                                 
57 Ibid.  
58 “Taking care of oneself requires knowing [connaitre] oneself. Care of 
the self is, of course, knowledge [connaissance] of the self-this is the Socratic-
Platonic aspect-but also knowledge of a number of rules of acceptable condu ct 
or of principles that are both truths and prescriptions. To take care of the self 
is to equip oneself with these truths: this is where ethics is linked to the game 
of truth.” Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of 
Freedom,” 285. 
59 “Of the four kinds of Greek harmony, the Dorian mode is courageous … 
It describes the harmony between word and deed in Socrates’ life … This 
harmonic accord also distinguishes Socrates from a sophist … Socrates is able 
to use rational, ethically valuable, fine, and beautiful discourse; but unlike the 
sophists, he can use parrhesia and speak freely because what he says accords 
exactly with what he thinks, and what he thinks accords exactly with what he 
does. Foucault, Fearless Speech, 100-101. 
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“It is difficult to recognize and to accept a parrhesiastes. For not only is 
it difficult to distinguish a true parrhesiastes from a flatterer; because 
of our philautia we are also not interested in recognizing a 
parrhesiastes.”61 Hence, Plutarch gives two criteria on how to 
recognize an authentic one: first is the already mentioned harmony 
between words and deeds exemplified by Socrates, “the conformity 
between what the real truth-teller says with how he behaves,”62 and 
the second is “the permanence, the continuity, the stability and 
steadiness of the true parrhesiastes, the true friend, regarding his 
choices, his opinions, and his thoughts.”63 Foucault also calls the 
second criterion “steadiness of mind.”64 The friend as a parrhesiastes is 
further cited by Foucault in the Epicurean schools where the 
philosopher acts as a “spiritual guide” for other people. Philodemus 
refers to the practice of “salvation by one another”65 or in Foucault’s 
words, “mutual confession”66 where the philosopher who exercises 
sovereignty over himself helps others to gain salvation, not in the 
sense of an afterlife but “access to a good, beautiful, and happy life.”67 
Foucault continues that,  
 
In one’s own salvation, other members of the Epicurean 
community [The Garden] have a decisive role to play as 
necessary agents enabling one to discover the truth about 
oneself, and in helping one to gain access to a happy li fe. 
Hence, the very important emphasis on friendship in the 
Epicurean groups.68 
 
In addition to the list where Plutarch is already included, Foucault 
also observes that in “Seneca, and the traditions which derives from 
Socrates, the parrhesiastes always needs to be a friend … the friendship 
relation was always at the root of the parrhesiastic game.”69 In the 
Care of the Self, Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius are mentioned 
by Foucault as recommending self-examination as mode of cultivating 
the self where a friend takes the role of a confidant.  
                                                 
61 Ibid., 135. 
62 Ibid., 136. 
63 Ibid.  
64 Ibid., 137.  
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There are also the talks that one has with a confidant, with 
friends, with a guide or director. Add to this the 
correspondence in which one reveals the state of one's soul, 
solicits advice, gives advice to anyone who needs it-which for 
that matter constitutes a beneficial exercise for the giver, who 
is called the preceptor, because he thereby re-actualizes it for 
himself.70 
 
Friendship in these many textual and historical artifacts is 
presented by Foucault as an ethical enterprise where the cultivation of 
oneself is linked to the relation one assumes with others in the 
community. As an ethical enterprise, friendship is geared towards an 
aesthetics of existence which launches from the basic labor of caring 
for the self. What remains to be enunciated is the idea of friendship as 
it is now an issue for us in the present and problematized by Foucault 




In the concluding remarks of his lectures on Fearless Speech, 
Foucault says that problematization is “always a kind of creation.”71 
This is semantically charged with the practice and experience of 
freedom in the very activity of critique. With the model of the Greeks’ 
problematizations of aspects of their experience so that they could 
constitute themselves as subjects of their own acts, the 
problematization of homosexuality likewise banners the flag of 
liberation. Tom Roach’s claim is precise when he writes that, “one such 
important insight from Foucault’s late work concerns the delinking of 
sexuality and truth in friendship and the consequent relinking of self-
knowledge and self-transformation.”72 Foucault’s critique of 
homosexuality as a problem of friendship strikes a shattering blow to 
the disciplinary and biopolitical discourse of sexuality and ignites the 
engine of becoming, of creation. In his description of friendship in the 
interview as “a relationship that is formless” and “which has to be 
invented from A to Z,” Foucault salvages friendship from discourses 
that would otherwise arrest its becoming from one’s own canvass. 
                                                 
70 Foucault, The Care of the Self, 51. 
71 Foucault, Fearless Speech, 173.  
72 Tom Roach, Friendship as a Way of Life: Foucault, AIDS, and the Politics 
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Borrowing Roach’s words that “If, for Foucault, the becoming of 
homosexuality is friendship, it is because friendship is always a 
becoming”73 The deployment of sexuality is the present discourse from 
which friendship must be wrenched away in order for an aesthetics of 
existence or a mode of existence between friends could be fashioned. 
Hence, I again concur with Roach that “such friendship only comes into 
being when homosexuality as a sexological concept is annihilated.”74 
With “homosexuality” overcome, friendship is then left on the friends’ 
invention and reinvention in a way of life that is lived according to 
their initiatives and resistance from multifarious forces and 
“technologies” of imposition and docility. Friendship is each other’s 





Carvalho, John M. “For the Love of Boys” in Foucault Studies 17:  213-231, April 
2014. 
Foucault, Michel. Fearless Speech. Edited by Joseph Pearson. Los Angeles, 
California: Semiotext, 2001. 
_____. “Friendship as a Way of Life” in Ethics Subjectivity and Truth The Essential 
Works of Michel Foucault. Volume 1. Edited by Paul Rabinow. New York: 
The New Press, 1994. 
_____. “The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom” in Ethics 
Subjectivity and Truth: The Essential Works of Michel Foucault. Volume 1. 
Edited by Paul Rabinow. New York: The New Press, 1994. 
_____. The History of Sexuality Volume 1: An Introduction. Translated by Robert 
Hurley. New York: Vintage Books, 1990. 
_____. The Use of Pleasure: Volume 2 of The History of Sexuality. Translated by 
Robert Hurley. New York: Vintage Books, 1990. 
_____. The Care of the Self: Volume 3 of The History of Sexuality. Translated by 
Robert Hurley. New York: Pantheon Books, 1986. 
Kitto, H.D.F. The Greeks. Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books, 1965. 
May, Todd. The Philosophy of Michel Foucault. Bucks: Acumen Publishing 
Limited, 2006. 
Mcgushin, Edward F. Foucault’s Askesis: An Introduction to the Philosophical 
Life. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2007. 
Nehamas, Alexander. The Art of Living: Socratic Reflections from Plato to 
Foucault. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998.   
Parr, Adrian. The Deleuze Dictionary. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2010. 
                                                 
73 Ibid., 15. 




74     Victor John M. Loquias 
Roach, Tom. Friendship as a Way of Life: Foucault, AIDS, and the Politics of 
Shared Estrangement. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2012. 
 
 
